THE NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY (NACTEST)

2016 (REVISED)

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PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1. Terrorism seeks to undermine national security, which is the primary duty of any government. Its perpetrators seek to undermine the unity of the Country and the sanctity of human life. Terrorism is a dynamic, adaptive, and ever-evolving threat, and has become a major international issue that requires a comprehensive strategy.

2. Terrorism cannot be justified by its perpetrators with race, religion, or political inclinations. The indiscriminate killings of people and the incessant destruction of properties will never be excused under any guise. The fear and apprehension induced, affects the minds and psychology of the citizenry and the general disposition of the Country.

3. Terrorism in Nigeria and in some other developing countries stems partly from lack, poverty, illiteracy, a feeling of exclusiveness and distrust in the Government, most of which are a derivative of the cancer of corruption that has eaten deep into the fabric of the Nation. Corruption, which breeds violent extremism and terrorism, is a radicalizer in itself, as it destroys faith in a legitimate government and aids the narratives of the perpetrators.

4. In view of the devastating causes and effects of terrorism, the need for a holistic approach at tackling the menace calls for a sustained fight against corruption and other drivers of radicalization. Stakeholders must be collaborative and coordinated to degrade the menace of terrorism. The first edition of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was developed in 2014, is now reviewed for this purpose. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) as initially directed will continue to drive the process by supporting institutions to develop capacities and capabilities to mitigate and respond to threats. The ONSA and all tasked stakeholders will continue to do this within the ambit of the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) as amended and ensure the observance of international best practices and human rights.

5. As part of my efforts to continue to push against corruption and engender transparency, accountability, security and positive change, I directed the review of the NACTEST. This bi-annual review will allow stakeholders to assess developments and take into account evolving trends, modify roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, and track milestones.

6. The National Security Adviser is hereby directed to continue to coordinate and drive the process. Given this st

day of August 2016 in Abuja.

MUHAMMADU BUHARI President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

T H E N AT I O N A L C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M S T R AT E G Y (N A C T E S T) 2 0 1 6 (R E V I S E D)

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FOREWORD

1. The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) is a living document that will continue to undergo reviews, as the issues involved are fluid and constantly evolving. The review will be on a bi-annual basis or as the situation demands. Over the years, and especially between 2010 when Nigeria recorded its first major terror attack and now, the menace has continued to show the ability to wreck major havoc. The phenomenon lends itself to reckless and indiscriminate use of violence and has assumed a level of sophistication that has seen incidents rise in profile. Reference can be made to the bombings of 1 October 2010 (Eagle Square); 16 June 2011 (Police Headquarters); 28 August 2011 (United Nations Office); the 25 February 2014 Buni Yadi Killings and the 14 April 2014 Chibok Schoolgirls abduction as game changing incidents. However, the unrelenting response of the Security Agencies, especially in the North East, and the complimentary effort of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Program – Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has recorded major achievements and contributed to the reduction in the spate of attacks.

2. In line with the Country's resolve to degrade the phenomenon, Security Services, Ministries, Department and Agencies are expected to abide strictly with the roles and responsibilities as tasked in this all important document. They are to work collaboratively with one another and with the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to ensure they undertake programmes and projects that are both counter terrorism relevant and specific, according to the provisions of their mandates, to position the Country by being resistant and responsive to terrorism.

3. The Civil Society Organizations and the citizenry would also be part of the national counter terrorism drive as efforts would be deployed to engage them accordingly. The NACTEST must therefore be regarded as not just a security document, but also a national document, that calls for the utmost contribution and participation of all stakeholders and Nigerians as a whole.

4. The ONSA will continue to play a coordinating role and ensure synergy amongst stakeholders as they also provide a monitoring and evaluation framework to appraise the process. NACTEST is therefore to provide a working template to counter terrorism in all ramifications.

Dated August 2016

BABAGANA MOHAMMED MONGUNO Major General (Rtd) National Security Adviser.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) is the first major attempt by the Government of Nigeria to address the terror attacks that are being perpetrated by violent extremist organizations against the citizens of this Country. NACTEST is also the first published document that has chronicled the Country's effort at combating an apparently new phenomenon of terrorism. As a subset of the overarching National Security Strategy, it holds a strong promise for Nigerians and seeks to re-engage a stakeholder population that is losing or may have lost faith in ongoing efforts aimed at addressing the threats. This document describes that strategy and it is not only fairly simple, straightforward but also achievable and time-bound. It also explains what MDAs and individuals can do to facilitate in its implementation in order to reduce the risks and ensure that people go about their normal businesses freely and with confidence.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

2. For the purpose of this document, the terms terrorism, insurgency, counter terrorism and counter insurgency will be defined as follows:

a. Terrorism. The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) definition of terrorism will be adopted as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act." Also, the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013 as amended defines terrorism as "an act deliberately done to harm or cause damage with the intent to intimidate, destabilse or negatively influence a group of people, organization or government in other to achieve a political, religious, economic or social goal".

b. Counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism is defined as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism.

c. Insurgency. Insurgency means "an organized armed struggle by a group aimed at weakening the authority of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in order to force a political change through the propagation of extremist ideology, under the guise of politico- economic marginalization."

d. Counter-Insurgency. Counter-Insurgency (COIN) is the "range of military, political and socio-economic measures adopted by a State in response to the outbreak of

insurgency". It involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. A COIN campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines. These other lines may be economical, socio political, educational, religious and information lines of operations carried out by different government ministries, departments and agencies.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

3. Terrorism in its present form, is a relatively new phenomenon in Nigeria, even though terror- related acts had occurred in the 1950s in Kano and, again, in 1982 when the Maitasine religious uprising was recorded. Both were respectively dismissed as mere violent crimes or externally sponsored extremist acts that were promptly nipped in the bud. While it may not be entirely correct to conclude that these events may have sowed the seeds for the growth of the current threat posed by Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad aka Boko Haram, what is clear is that the group, unlike its predecessors, has remained faceless with no defined frontiers, making it extremely difficult to effectively contain the threat. The group is a tiny minority within the Muslim communities which first emerged in Borno State in 2000 using a distorted and unrepresentative interpretation of the Islamic faith to justify violence. With links to other global Islamic groups like al- Qaeda and al-Shabaab, the group is considered to be genuinely international in scope and, like its foreign affiliates, driven by particularly violent and extremist Islamist beliefs. Clearly, the threat from global Islamist terrorism is real and involves a variety of groups, networks and individuals blinded by extremist beliefs and determined to cause indiscriminate mass casualties, regardless of age, sex, race and nationality, or the religion of the victims. In certain cases, the terrorists are prepared to commit suicide to kill others.

4. A number of factors will continue to enable terrorist groups to grow and survive. They include: conflict and instability, aspects of modern technology, poverty, lack of education and family values, a pervasive ideology and radicalisation. Unfortunately, these are variables that will remain an integral part of globalisation. It is therefore safe to judge that the scale of the threat has the potential to increase and is not likely to diminish significantly in the coming years.

THE RESPONSE

5. The NACTEST is organised around five work streams, each with its key objectives and success indicators. The five work streams are:

a. Forestall. To stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

b. Secure. Strengthen protection capacity against terrorist attacks. c. Identify. Pre-emption through detection, early warning and ensuring that terrorist acts are properly investigated. d. Prepare. To mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks by building resilience and redundancies to ensure continuity of business. e. Implement. A framework for the mobilization of coordinated cross-governmental efforts.

FORESTALL

6. The Forestall strand is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals and emphasizing security awareness amongst the populace. The key objectives are:

a. Develop an effective counter-narrative to respond to the challenge of terrorism. b. Create conditions to deter people from embracing terrorism and extremist ideologies. c. Initiate programs that would require engagements with key sectors, particularly the Internet, identified as possible tools for radicalisation. d. Initiate programs to identify the underlying cause of radicalisation and develop strategies that provide solutions. e. Create opportunity and hope for people in the affected communities and restore their faith in the Government.

SECURE

7. The Secure strand is concerned with safeguarding citizens and infrastructure by reducing their vulnerability to attacks. The key objectives are:

a. Reduce vulnerability of the national populace. b. Initiate measures aimed at strengthening border security. c. Introduce effective ways for protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and building resilience. d. Embark on capacity-building programs for security forces. e. Reduce the vulnerability of the transport system. f. Improve protective security for crowded places such as schools, motor parks, shopping malls, market places and worship centres.

IDENTIFY

8. The Identify strand is concerned with stopping terrorist threats and attacks on Nigeria and her interests. The key objectives are:

a. Disrupt terrorist threats before they are executed. b. Ensure an increase in the capabilities of security agencies to detect, prevent, investigate and prosecute.

c. Deny terrorists the ability to raise funds. d. Government, through its agencies, to maintain a sustainable relationship with community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). e. Work with foreign governments and multilateral organizations to better tackle threats from the source. f. Continue to assess security powers and review them as necessary. g. Build and improve capacity for the Criminal Justice System (CJS) to investigate, prosecute and sanction people who commit terrorist offences.

PREPARE

9. The Prepare strand is concerned with ensuring that the Nation is ready to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. The key objectives are:

a. First responders, security agencies and stakeholder organizations are able to respond to, and effectively recover from, various categories of terrorist attacks. b. There are dedicated agencies with capacity to respond to identified high-risk areas such as symbolic structures and worship centres. c. There are additional capabilities readily available to manage both ongoing and new terrorist attacks. d. There are in-built redundancies to ensure continuity of government business and measures adopted to ensure civil society resilience in the event of an attack.

IMPLEMENT

10. The Implement strand involves the cooperation at all levels – from the public to the private sector including civil society organisations. It includes a cross-governmental approach and stipulates how Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and stakeholder organizations will execute tasks consistent with their roles and statutory responsibilities. The Office of the National Security Adviser will provide the requisite leadership role in the national CT effort. The Implement

strand describes how the accountability of the strategy will be ensured and its progress effectively monitored. It is expected that all Security Agencies will conduct threat analysis and develop their own contingency plan to address implementation streams.

11. It is expected that MDAs and the Police will work together closely to a common set of objectives, with transparency and openness. Dialogue will be sought with the private sector, voluntary organizations, community groups and the general public. Success here will depend on the quality of engagement with all stakeholders, close allies and multilateral organizations.

CONCLUSION

12. Terrorism is the most potent threat currently confronting Nigeria. The NACTEST has been developed to tackle the threat and assure Nigerians of their safety. This document spells out Government's priorities and its resolve to protect the citizenry and make conditions unfavourable for terrorists and those who sponsor them.

13. The implementation of NACTEST imposes tasks on the security agencies as well as government and non-governmental agencies. Laying the foundation for goals to be attained in the short, medium and long term, the focus is to strive to have a strategy that will be effective, proportionate, transparent, collaborative, proactive and flexible.

INTRODUCTION

1. Terrorism has become a worldwide phenomenon that takes many forms and is therefore a cause for concern to all those seeking peace, security and stability. Terrorist activities have not only continued to pose significant challenges to international peace and security, they have compelled nations to place them on the list of their priorities, thereby stretching to the limit available meagre resources needed for developmental purposes. Terrorism is an unlawful and intentional act that causes death, physical and psychological injury, loss of liberty and serious damage to property and environment. It often involves an individual or a group united on a particular cause and resolved to unleash violence against society with the aim of creating fear in the populace and undermining the Government in order to achieve set political, ideological, economic or social goals. Nigeria has had its fair share of terror attacks in the past few years. The ongoing insurgency in the North-East has been curtailed, while the capacity of the Boko Haram Sect to carry out coordinated attacks has been degraded. Since the coordinated terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, in the United States of America (USA) by Al-Qaeda, the phenomenon has assumed a global dimension. No country, including Nigeria, is immune to attacks by terrorist groups.

2. Terrorism is the most serious security threat confronting Nigeria today. This is due to the actions of persons or groups who choose to advance their cause by committing acts of extreme violence against members of the society. The acts, which were hitherto considered as mere violent crimes, have claimed many lives and have been on the increase in the recent past. The current intensity of actions by such groups clearly points to an intention to create fear among the people and undermine the authority of Government. This, therefore, informed the need for a comprehensive National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) to effectively address the threat and reduce the risks so as to provide a safe environment where people can go about their daily lives freely and confidently.

3. Terrorism is a complex subject to tackle; therefore, actions taken to counter it must be a whole of a society approach. Considering the uncertainty that revolves around terrorism, it is challenging to collect credible data sufficient to propose holistic preventive measures. To effectively address issues of terrorism within the Country, properly planned preventive measures have been articulated in this document. These measures developed in the NACTEST would enable the effective protection of the public, assist appropriate organizations in preparing to deal with acts of terrorism, and pursue terrorists and those who sponsor them. Government's strategy is informed by the counter-terrorism strategies of countries, which have experienced the phenomenon. The NACTEST is therefore based on international best practices and tailored to address our domestic peculiarities with due cognizance of international human rights standards

and the rule of law. The range of policies, plans and programmes described in this text will, however, continue to be reviewed as necessary. NACTEST will explain actions being taken to safeguard the populace and public institutions in the face of terrorist activities.

SECTION I

OVERVIEW

GLOBAL

1.1 This is the first reviewed version of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). This new strategy takes full account of the terrorist threats in Nigeria and abroad and incorporates the measures put in place to counter these threats. The aim of NACTEST is to reduce the risk to the Country and its interests abroad from terrorism and to ensure that people can go about their lives unhindered.

1.2 It is on record that, in 2011 alone, over 15,000 people were killed in terrorist-related actions around the world. With collaboration and partnerships built by countries to check threats, terrorist groups have changed their modus operandi. There is a clear indication that Al Qaeda appears weak and directionless after the death of its two main leaders, Osama bin Laden and Anwar al- Awlaki while several senior leaders have been placed on 'kill or capture' list. This has not deterred the group and its affiliates as they continue to pose a threat to global security. It has since announced the appointment of Ayman al- Zawahiri as its new leader.

1.3 Al Qaeda affiliates have continued to grow using the Al Qaeda name but often operating without reference to its leadership. The most significant of these groups has proved to be the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formed in 2009 when members of Al Qaeda fled Saudi Arabia and joined an Al Qaeda network based in Yemen. Apart from masterminding the attack on a Detroit-bound airliner, AQAP also conducts operations internally and outside the Peninsula. The other group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is known to confine its operational activity to the Maghreb and Sahel-Saharan African sub-region where they have repeatedly taken western hostages in exchange for ransom. Funds raised from these have significantly enhanced its operational capability and enabled it to operate more widely in Mali and Niger. It has been confirmed that the recent instability in Libya has also enabled AQIM to acquire weapons from different sources. AQIM has reportedly established links with Boko Haram to make forays into volatile areas in the North-East of Nigeria and possibly other parts of the country.

1.4 Other affiliates such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions (AQKB) have indicated an aspiration to export terrorist activities to other parts of the Globe. The Pakistan Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is known to collaborate with Al Qaeda and other local groups. In Somalia, the clan-based militia Al Shabaab continues to control southern parts of the

country. Al Shabaab has adopted the global jihadist ideology and has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters including Nigerians. It has links with Al Qaeda and AQIM and operates more widely in East Africa. It is likely that Al Shabaab, which is reportedly providing training and support to Boko Haram, may formally affiliate with Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups by their actions of recruiting people, raising funds and driven by extremist religious ideologies collectively pose a threat to Nigeria and her interests abroad. Factors that will continue to fuel the growth and survival of terrorist groups are conflicts and instability, modern technology, radicalisation, extreme ideologies, lack of education, intolerance, poverty, corruption, unemployment, ethno-religious differences and societal vices.

DOMESTIC

1.5 The greatest threat to Nigeria currently has come from the Boko Haram terrorist group based in the Northeastern part of the Country, and more prevalent in Borno, and Yobe States. Nigerians among other nationals have travelled to training grounds in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia to mention but a few. This has increased the threat levels in Nigeria. In the past three years, there have been more than a hundred terrorist attacks. Below is a chart showing a State-by-State analysis of attacks:

1.6 The emergence of Boko Haram did not occur overnight. It is the outcome of a consistent deterioration process, fuelled not only by religious fundamentalism but social, economic, political and global factors. The fundamental conditions that are the root causes of the menace still exist and serve as fertile grounds for further escalation. Boko Haram's ideology, much like other al Qaeda affiliates, is based on complete denouncement of western culture and civilisation. Their ultimate goal is to overthrow the existing political order and replace it with a strict Islamic system. In recent times, we have witnessed a surge in the levels of violence associated with Boko Haram. This worrisome trend has led to a rise in the group's level of sophistication, which has emboldened them to launch strikes across the entire nation, causing substantial damage to lives and property.

1.7 The assumption is that future activities of Boko Haram will evolve in accordance with the modus operandi of global Islamic terrorist groups. Challenging though this might seem, it provides the opportunity to make predictions and outline elements that should be incorporated into a strategy that would comprehensively address the threat. As with other notorious terrorist groups like al Qaeda, the established trend has been to launch attacks on symbolic structures but lately, Boko Haram has included Christian worship centres to its list of soft targets. The aim is to inflame religious and ethnic sentiments and further cause divisions in the polity. To this end, print and electronic media operations would be necessary to shape public opinion. The struggle against terrorism is not limited to defined frontiers, but very much influenced by the ability to control public agenda and manage public opinion. Public support is the ultimate objective because the long- term struggle can only be determined by winning the hearts and minds of the population. This strategy therefore addresses the social and political climate that has contributed to the creation of the scourge and seeks ways to eliminate the root causes.

1.8 The number of arrests made in Nigeria on suspicion of terrorism from 2004 to date is quite substantial. Many have undergone prosecution in various courts but with scant convictions. Many more are yet to be charged to court and remain in custody. The prison system and indeed the entire Criminal Justice System (CJS) are undergoing a substantial overhaul in order to address the issues properly. Concerted efforts are being put in place to build capacity for the various sections that make up the CJS so that those charged with the responsibility of working with the laws are able to understand them properly.

1.9 It is pertinent to state that the ongoing terrorist threat in the Country is not being viewed in the right perspective. No doubt, the global network on terror is determined to bring the free world to its knees. By going ideological, it is clear that terrorist groups are prepared for the long haul. The response therefore should be tailored towards a sustained awareness campaign. Nigerians should be aware and come to terms with the fact that it is a phenomenon that would require long-term measures to contain. What is happening now is not an anomaly. Rather, it is an

unfolding reality of the twenty-first century, which has witnessed advancements in technology and transformed the world into a massive global village. It is only our collective effort and resolve as a people to come to terms with this phenomenon and our determination to fight it that will keep the situation at tolerable levels.

SECTION II

THE THREAT

2.1 Terrorism is an old tool used by those who hold extremist views on issues with little regard for human lives. The United Nations defines terrorism as the use of military weapons or forces to generate multiple casualty incidents in which non-combatants and vulnerable civilians are the victims. It feeds on fear amongst the populace and media coverage for attention. From the early 1990s, groups claiming to be Islamist terrorist organizations have carried out numerous attacks in many countries. Worldwide, bomb attacks were carried out against the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the Paris metro in 1995. These were followed by attacks in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tanzania, Kenya and Yemen.

2.2 The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, the commercial nerve-centre of the World, in which nearly 3,000 people were killed is regarded as the watershed in international terrorism. Since then, other attacks have been carried out in countries such as Turkey, France, Belgium and Jordan. The Bali bombing in Indonesia in 2002 also took a great toll on human life. The attacks have continued unabated with those of Madrid in 2004, United Kingdom in 2005 and consistently sustained attacks in Pakistan, Iraq, Kenya and Afghanistan.

2.3 At the regional level, attacks on the USA embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salam in Tanzania as well as a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, on 7 August 1998 by al Qaeda and others in Egypt and Algeria had already placed Africa on the terrorism map. Activities of al-Shabaab fundamentalists in Somalia have compounded the situation in the East and the Horn of Africa. On 21 September 2013 the group attacked Westgate Mall where 67 people were killed and several others held hostages injured. Furthermore, the increased activities of the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has now transformed to AQIM in North Africa and parts of West Africa such as in Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, Niger and Nigeria, remain areas of serious security concern. AQIM has conducted a series of terrorist acts in West Africa, which include the kidnapping of Europeans.

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

2.4 Terrorism in its present form is a relatively new phenomenon in Nigeria. Suicide attacks were never a part of the calculation whenever the issue of terrorism was discussed. The early acts of terrorism, especially the Kano killings of 1952, were dismissed as mere violent crimes. The first recorded major incident was in 1980 when an extremist religious group, "the Maitatsine religious sect" which is believed to have developed from a neighbouring country carried out attacks in

many parts of northern Nigeria over a period of time, but was successfully contained by Government largely because the frontlines were easily defined. In October 1993, a political dimension was added to the national experience when a Nigeria Airways flight was hijacked in Kano by a group known as the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy in Nigeria led by Jerry Yusuf. Terrorist attacks were also perpetrated by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and other South-South and South-East groups predicated on agitations against environmental degradation, perceived marginalization and the quest for resource control. The culminations of these agitations were incidents of kidnapping, killings of government security agents, attacks on oil installations, illegal oil bunkering and other acts of armed banditry witnessed in the Niger Delta.

2.5 The current threat is mainly from the Boko Haram, which emerged in Borno State in 2000. The group was founded by the late Mohammed Yusuf who moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, close to the border with Niger Republic, in 2003 at a base dubbed 'Afghanistan'. The movement, 'The Nigerian Taliban', which eventually emerged, targeted the Police and other security agencies to source for weapons, thus creating fear and a sense of insecurity in the locals. This group was initially contained by the security forces, again because the frontiers were defined. But when it later metamorphosed into the Boko Haram sect, it gradually went underground and became faceless. Currently, a splinter faction has emerged from the wider Boko Haram umbrella called Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan simply known as Ansaru.

2.6 Today, Boko Haram is seeking to impose the Sharia legal system on some selected States in the North while holding strong abhorrence for Western ideals. The threat is serious and remains sustained as the sect vows to continue its activities at all costs. The extent of its international reach cannot be ascertained but it is clear that it is linked to the international terror network. Its link with AQIM and al-Shabaab points to its web in the global terrorist network driven by particularly violent and extremist inclination and beliefs aimed at causing mass casualties. It has been assessed that the threat is not likely to diminish soon probably due to the immense support it enjoys from global terrorist groups like AQAP, AQIM and al-Shabaab. Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the profile of the sect has continued to assume martyrdom status.

2.7 Several factors are responsible for the creation and nurturing of terrorism in Nigeria by individuals and groups. They could be categorized under economic, political and social reasons. Nigeria is perceived as a potential terrorist interest area as expressed in a televised Osama Bin Laden video message. Furthermore, Nigeria is the gateway to the strategically important Gulf of Guinea from where Western countries especially the USA draw a huge amount of their energy requirements. The close economic ties with USA could be a major reason for singling out Nigeria as a country ripe for a Jihad. With the Salafist ideological teaching that propagates western

civilisation as evil, the predominantly large Muslim population is cited as a fertile ground for recruitment.

2.8 Activities of the Boko Haram sect have led to mixed reactions amongst a cross-section of the populace. Despite the increasing radicalization and frequency of attacks, the Nation's intelligence and security agencies have recorded significant breakthroughs in dealing with attacks by the Islamic terrorists. The tragic incidents of 1 October 2010 (Independence Day), 25 and 31 December 2010, and other bombing incidents in Abuja have shown that eliminating the threat of terrorism in Nigeria would require dynamic, consistent and sustained measures.

2.9 The NACTEST has identified certain pitfalls in the national security system and some common and regular crimes, which have further worsened the security situation and inadvertently provided an environment conducive for terrorist acts. These include crimes involving religious extremism, armed banditry, kidnapping and assassinations. Others are arms smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, bombings and the increased use of improvised explosive devices. The most significant fault line, however, is the twin issue of poverty and unemployment. According to statistics released by the Nigerian Manpower Board (NMB), only about 3.2 million out of an estimated 22 million in the school system enter the labour market annually because the labour system can hardly absorb 10 percent of the entire school output.

NATURE OF INCIDENTS

2.10 The phenomenon of terrorism may have no particular trend or pattern. It may also have no distinctive characteristic. However, the nature of terrorist incidents can be said to assume the following pattern:

a. The threat is generally ubiquitous – the same way terrorist attacks have been carried out in many countries. These attacks have been carried out by individuals or groups from the core group or by outsiders or a combination of both. This accounts for the nexus between the domestic and international dimensions of terrorism. Facilitating the ease of attacks is the nature of the globalised world where there exists a seamless ease for travelling as well as information and money flow across the world.

b. The influence of non-state actors in sponsoring terrorism has become more pronounced in contemporary terrorism.

c. The threat of terrorism comes from organized groups and individuals with loosely organized networks. However, the different elements that constitute these groups may have different goals to achieve.

d. Terrorist groups operate indiscriminately, mostly in loose or sleeper cells. They could also be nimble and therefore difficult to trace. The main goal is to cause mass death and destruction regardless of age, sex, race, nationality or religion. Fundamentally, terrorists target prominent government institutions, but they also target institutions/infrastructures that have symbolic value for the message they intend to convey. In many cases, terrorists are prepared to go suicidal in the process of carrying out such attacks.

e. People involved in these attacks are driven by passionate violent and extremist beliefs either as religious bigots/adherents or in an attempt to express their views, which they perceive as being discounted.

RESPONSE TO THE THREATS

2.11 Responding to the threat require a strategy for counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. Ostensibly, the NACTEST is about how to reduce the risk to Nigeria from terrorism so that people can go about their daily businesses freely. To realize this goal, the Federal Government through the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has put in place a comprehensive programme of action in the short and long terms. The objectives involve activities at both national and local levels.

2.12 The Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has the overall responsibility for coordinating the National Counter-Terrorism Programme. The primary responsibilities of the CTC include the development, direction and implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It is also responsible for the implementation of some aspects of the strategy, while facilitating oversight of operations by security and intelligence agencies. The NACTEST is divided into five work streams with the acronym FSIPI [pronounced as ef-cee-pee]. The work streams are:

a. Forestall. Preventing terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment/sensitization campaign and de-radicalization programmes.

b. Secure. Ensuring protection of life and property, public and key national infrastructure/services including Nigerian interests around the world.

c. Identify. Ensuring that all terrorist acts are properly investigated while terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.

d. Prepare. Preparing the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents

could be mitigated.

e. Implement. Devising a framework to effectively mobilize and sustain a coordinated cross-governmental population-centred effort.

In doing these, the government will take cognizance of international law and human rights standards which will be integral to driving the counter-terrorism effort. In a similar vein, the campaign efforts would aim at achieving social cohesion, active citizenship and equality in order to build active population resistance to terrorism.

PRINCIPLES

2.13 The Government believes that respect for international law and human rights must be an integral part of its efforts to counter terrorism. The provision and promotion of good governance is also a key element of wider efforts to combat terrorism and extremism. Similarly, the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion and active citizenship will strengthen society and resistance to terrorism.

2.14 The successful delivery of NACTEST, therefore, depends on partnership between all tiers of Government. The public, private sector and voluntary organizations as well as partnerships with foreign governments and organizations. This document emphasizes cohesive action from all government departments charged with law enforcement, border control, finance, health, foreign affairs, and defence policies. A lot also depends on the efforts of all well-meaning Nigerians and members of host communities. In essence, the overriding principles of NACTEST must be:

a. Effective. The progress made and outcome of the strategy will be regularly assessed while all actions taken would be measurable.

b. Proportionate. Government will ensure that efforts put into its National Counter- Terrorism Programmes (NCTP) are proportionate to the risks we face and necessary to reduce those risks to a level adjudged acceptable.

c. Transparent. At all times and consistent with the security threats we face, we will seek to make information available about the threats we face, the options we have and the response we intend.

d. Flexible. Terrorists will seek new tactics to exploit vulnerabilities in our protective security. We will, therefore, regularly re-assess the risk and ensure that such assessment is the foundation of Government efforts.

e. Collaborative. Countering terrorism requires a local, national and international response. Apart from the much-needed interagency collaboration, the government in conjunction with relevant agencies will continue to work at all tiers of government (Federal, State and Local Governments), public, private sectors, foreign governments, regional and international organizations and the public.

f. Proactive. Focus would be on the disruption of terrorist acts before they take root.

SECTION III

FORESTALL

3.1 The Forestall aspect of the NACTEST entails both domestic and international efforts and would cover the period 2016 and beyond. At the national level, the Government will focus on addressing issues, which will diminish the capability of terrorists to operate freely in Nigeria. Priorities in this regard will involve creating and emphasizing security awareness amongst the populace, reducing the possibility and ability of terrorist groups to recruit new members and support, while introducing measures that will deter potential terrorists. Properly planned and adequately resourced preventive measures, when employed, would reduce the frequency of attacks. The objectives of the Forestall pillar of NACTEST within the period 2016 and beyond will be to:

 a. Develop an effective counter-narrative to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism from those who propagate it. b. Create conditions to deter people from embracing terrorism and extremist ideologies. c. Initiate programs that would require engagements with key sectors (education, criminal justice, faith-based organisations, health and the internet) identified as possible areas for radicalisation. d. Initiate programmes to identify the underlying cause of radicalisation and develop strategies that provide solutions. e. Create opportunities and hope for people in the affected communities and restore their faith in the government.

SECURITY AWARENESS

3.2 It has been observed – and reasonably so too – that carnage arising from the action of terrorist groups over the years could have been reduced if the populace was more security- conscious. Most Nigerians would see situations, events or objects that are inimical to their personal security without realizing that they face grave danger. It is, therefore, necessary to develop security consciousness amongst the entire populace. An informed, proactive and situation-aware citizenry is an invaluable asset in combating terrorist activities.

3.3 Concerted media campaigns will need to be developed towards keeping the populace aware in order to dispel the uncertainties associated with terrorist attacks. School curricular at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels should not only be geared towards promoting national security awareness but should also include a robust civic education programmes. Civic

education especially should be taught as a distinct subject because it is foundational and provides the opportunity to positively impact on the minds of future generations of Nigerians and create highly patriotic citizens. The media (print and electronic) will be employed to effect changes in the attitude and behaviours of people to enable them take appropriate actions that will prevent or frustrate terrorist attacks. A comprehensive awareness campaign strategy would also include other forms of engagement with stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Both would be time-bound, reviewable and address all unfolding terrorism scenarios.

TACKLING DISADVANTAGES AND SUPPORTING REFORMS

3.4 Another area of action to prevent terrorism lies in addressing structural problems in the Country that may contribute to providing willing hands for recruitment by terrorist groups. Governments (Federal, State and Local) will aggressively tackle structures, which give vent to social systems that exploit and impoverish individuals in their formative years. As young adults, these people are neither educated nor possess any skills to enable them integrate fully into the society. In particular are social systems that promote issues like the 'Area Boys', Street Urchins, Criminal Vigilante Groups and the 'Almajirai' educational systems. These systems, which thrive in areas of extreme poverty and deprivation, produce youths who are easily radicalized through inappropriate teachings.

3.5 To stem the number of available persons who may be easily recruited by terrorists, government will address matters relating to incitement and recruitment in places of religious training or worship by introducing legislations, which criminalize such behaviour. Additionally, promotion of good governance, education and economic prosperity will be emphasized and aggressively implemented at all levels. Deterrence can be achieved where infrastructural facilities such as roads, energy, hospitals and health centres are available. These should be provided in conjunction with dependable information technology architecture to assist security managers in timely information processing, sharing and utilization.

DETERRING THOSE WHO FACILITATE TERRORISM

3.6 A major area of action towards preventing terrorism is by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalizing others can operate as well as deterring those who facilitate terrorist activities and those who encourage others to become terrorists. The influence of particular places of worship has already been mentioned. There is also evidence that individuals can become radicalized through brainwashing, coercion and threat to family members.

3.7 Government will work with local authorities to identify areas where radicalization may be

taking place and to help communities protect themselves and counter the efforts of extremists. Therefore, challenging and responding to ideological motivations and extremist beliefs that justify the use of violence are a priority. In particular, Government will work with communities to help them discourage susceptible individuals from turning towards extremist activities. Efforts will be made to leverage on the capacities of institutions like hospitals and schools to de-radicalize persons who may not have reached the tipping point in the radicalization ladder. The process will be driven by specialists in the health sector and trained administrators in the educational sector. For the detained extremists, it will be necessary to establish a de-radicalization centre to help integrate them into the society. As for the convicted terrorists serving jail terms, a comprehensive program will be developed to not only get them de-radicalized but ensure that they are introduced to sustainable vocational training that would prepare and rehabilitate them for reintegration into the main society. The Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS) should develop capacity for its personnel and institutions for this form of de-radicalization.

3.8 Furthermore, the signing into law of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 is a clear indication of Government's resolve to deal decisively with individuals or groups who choose to challenge the sovereignty of the Nation. Government's response to contravention of extant laws shall, therefore, be swift with the aim of sending a clear message to perpetrators and deterring like-minded individuals and groups that terrorism is unacceptable in Nigeria. Government will therefore support and encourage capacity-building initiatives in all key areas of the CJS.

3.9 The Forestall programme is, by its very nature, a long-term dynamic commitment that will take time to produce concrete results. Even with a robust programme in place, complete prevention of terrorism acts cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, stringent measures will be employed to minimize attacks by ensuring strategic improvements in protection and security. Success in Forestall would entail:

a. A considerable reduction in the number of persons that are at risk of being radicalised. b. Increased awareness penetration in the public and private sectors. c. Ensuring that extremists are isolated and not able to operate freely on the Internet and other high-risk radicalisation media. d. Creation of job opportunities through establishment of Small Business Enterprises and other government initiatives. e. Identification of credible voices in communities to speak out against extremism. f. A considerable number of terrorist convicts are deradicalized.

g. A considerable number of NPS staff are professionally trained to handle terror suspects and issues of rehabilitation.

PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

3.10 To forestall is to prevent violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism. Implementing the NACTEST through a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society approach will involve institutionalising and mainstreaming practices across Federal, States and Local Governments that are designed to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. In order to synergise and effectively coordinate programmes by focal MDAs, Nigeria will develop a Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism through a consultative process. This policy framework will build on Nigeria's experiences in handling terrorism and violent extremism since 2012. As an active partner in the global effort to address violent extremism, Nigeria will be guided by the United Nation Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Implementing agencies will be required to develop programmes along the Policy Framework, which will involve the collaboration of Civil society.

3.11 To effectively counter violent extremism, Nigeria is institutionalising and mainstreaming deradicalization in Prisons to effectively handle violent extremist offenders. A renewed approach to countering extremism will focus on education, sports, art, music, culture and religion as national resources for building community resilience to terrorism, including entrenching an early warning mechanism. A Post Traumatic Stress Disorder counseling programme will be part of Nigeria's response to terrorism in addressing the needs of victims, violent extremist offenders who voluntarily submit to engagement programmes and affected communities.

3.12 In all efforts to prevent and counter violent extremist narratives, Nigeria will synchronise words and deeds to amplify positive narratives. The NACTEST will utilize and leverage on information and communication infrastructure across Federal, States and Local Governments to dismantle violent extremist narratives. A National Strategic Communication Strategy that will guide this effort will be implemented through the Ministry of Information and Culture, which shall come up with a yearly national strategic communication action plan. The strategic communication action plan will support communication initiatives of MDAs and ensure that Nigeria responds to the threat of terrorism with one voice.

SECTION IV

SECURE

4.1 Within the period 2016 and beyond, the Secure aspect of NACTEST will be concerned with safeguarding citizens, utilities and infrastructure by reducing their vulnerability to attacks. The Secure work stream covers a range of issues which include strengthening border security, protecting Critical National Infrastructures, capacity building for security forces and reducing risks to transportation systems, crowded places and worship centres. The objectives of the Secure strand within the period will be to:

a. Initiate measures aimed at strengthening border security. b. Introduce effective ways for protecting critical national infrastructure and build resiliency. c. Embark on capacity-building programs for security forces. d. Reduce the vulnerability of the transport system. e. Improve protective security for crowded places including

worship centres.

STRENGTHENING BORDER SECURITY

4.2 A major security concern within Nigeria is the ease with which persons and goods enter and leave the country through borders, which are inadequately protected. Notwithstanding the provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement between member states, it is expected that persons entering the country must be duly documented and accounted for. The porous nature of the borders has been responsible for the influx of illegal aliens, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, smuggling, trafficking in persons, illegal cross-border trading and other trans-border crimes. Irrespective of the strength in cross-border cultural affinity, the effect of criminally minded individuals entering the country to perpetrate acts of terrorism is high. This will require establishing joint border patrols with contiguous neighbours and enhancing traditional border security systems.

4.3 Security at the borders will be strengthened through intensification of patrols. The effectiveness of the agencies would also be enhanced through provision of adequate equipment, building synergy and promoting closer collaboration. The entire border management system will cooperate with security agencies of neighbouring countries. This will strengthen border security and also minimize illegitimate traffic. All national assets would be harnessed and properly exploited to strengthen and enhanced border security.

4.4 In essence, the objectives of the programme include: the provision of effective border control and improvement on intelligence sharing within and outside Nigeria in support of border operations. Other objectives will involve joint identification and management of risks as well as minimizing the impact of these operations on legitimate traffic and business.

PROTECTING CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

4.5 The Secure paradigm of NACTEST is aimed at reducing the nation's vulnerability to attacks on its infrastructure, which are critical to the corporate existence of Nigeria and the comfort of the populace. These infrastructures are essential to the wellbeing of Nigerians and they allow the citizenry to participate in the developmental programmes of the nation. They include key utilities such as energy, water as well as key services like transport, communication and finance. A comprehensive data of these infrastructure and installations are being maintained and would be reviewed periodically. Knowledge of the infrastructure and analyzing it from an adversary's point of view and training based on such knowledge would help build an effective protection plan.

4.6 Measures for protecting or defending key assets and essential facilities against terrorist attacks include collecting intelligence, analyzing vulnerabilities and applying preventive measures. Risks are identified and assessed to consider the probability of the occurrence with a view to predicting the impact. This helps to determine the priorities for protection, with the aim of reducing the vulnerability to, and the likelihood of, a terrorist attack.

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR SECURITY FORCES

4.7 Terrorists are usually fanatical, given their orientation and belief in their cause. The use of terror tactics worldwide has increased over the years due to the effect on the civil populace and governments. This upward trend is not expected to abate in the near future as terrorists are becoming more daring, ruthless and willing to go to violent extremes to accomplish their goals. This, therefore, requires the positioning of security forces that are sufficiently trained and equipped to adequately respond to the threat posed by terrorists.

4.8 Counter-terrorist forces must essentially be available to act with the various security response assets to intercede and prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks. It is crucial that individuals and organizations whose duty it is to protect installations do so accurately and effectively, either as part of law enforcement, emergency response, or military counter-terrorist teams. It is also crucial that these individuals or organizations be prepared and are able to work effectively with each other and with other specialized response personnel. This implies that the teams and other emergency response assets must plan and train for eventualities. The need for collective information sharing, scenario-based training and the development of similar and

complementary capabilities is therefore crucial.

4.9 All security and intelligence agencies are mandated to maintain Response Units (RU) or outfits in all parts of the country. These RUs are essential in protecting not only infrastructure but also the entire citizenry. The ONSA, through the CTC, is to coordinate and ensure oversight.

PROTECTING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND CROWDED PLACES

4.10 Terrorists perpetrate acts that endanger human lives, cause substantial damage to property or bring about other consequences dangerous to the public. These acts are committed to disrupt public safety and intimidate the population in order to cause loss of confidence in the Government.

4.11 Public knowledge of terrorism is, in general, limited to either specific terrorist incidents or censored information which governments and law enforcement bodies reveal to the media, usually after an attack. Therefore measures must be put in place to protect people in public and crowded places against acts of terrorism. Crowded places include shopping centres, airports, worship centres, sports arena, parks and recreational areas where maximum casualty could be achieved in the event of an attack. There is an increase in the level of armed protection at many key sites across the country. Protective security advice will be reliably provided to vulnerable sites which are prioritized based on assessed risks.

4.12 Aviation security has increasingly been on high priority since 2009. The incident where a taxi driver broke security and rammed into a passenger airliner at the Calabar Airport in 2010, the stowaway episode at Benin Airport in August 2013 and the attack at Nigerian Air force Base Maiduguri by some elements of the Boko Haram sect in November 2013 have shown that airport security system can be breached. Also, the vulnerability of aircraft from shoulder-fired surface-to- air missiles (SAM), especially from take-off and or landing, is an area of serious security concern. Although, our Airport security for passengers in the country has been strengthened with the introduction of non-discriminatory screening of persons and luggage using explosive detection devices, due attention would be given to the security of the perimeter of the airports, including aerial surveillance to mitigate these threats. These security measures will be regularly assessed and upgraded to detect and prevent any attack. Also an envisaged increase in the private ownership of infrastructure means that the private sector must understand the risks and vulnerabilities to enable capacity building in the area of resiliency. This would obviously require sharing of information in a safe and transparent manner.

4.13 The maritime domain is equally vulnerable to terrorist attack. A single container laden with explosives can cause considerable mass casualties, severe property damage, and attendant

disruption of commerce. The critical oil and gas industry is located within the maritime domain and its special protection from terror attack becomes inevitable. The ONSA is to put in place a maritime security strategy to ensure a coordinated effort by all security agencies to safeguard this vital national interest. Success in Secure will entail that, from 2016 and beyond, the following has been achieved:

a. Considerable reduction in the influx of illegal aliens and in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as cross-border crimes. b. There is credible information sharing between security agencies and other contiguous countries' agencies operating along our common borders. c. The vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure including airports and oil installations has been reduced to the minimum. d. There is a measurable increase in capacity building for personnel of the security agencies. e. There is a considerable reduction in the number of attacks on crowded places, particularly worship centres.

SECTION V

IDENTIFY

5.1 The Identify aspect of the NACTEST from 2016 and beyond is concerned with stopping terrorist threats and attacks on Nigeria and her interests. This implies detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible instance as well as disrupting terrorist operations before they can endanger the public, and ensuring the prosecution of those responsible. The objectives of the Identify pillar will be:

a. Disrupt terrorist threats before they are executed. b. Ensure an increase in the capabilities of security agencies to detect, investigate and prosecute.

c. Disrupt terrorists' ability to raise funds. d. Government, through its agencies, maintains a sustainable relationship with community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and civil society organizations.

 e. Work with foreign governments and multilateral organizations to better tackle threats from the source.

f. Continue to assess security powers and review them as necessary. g. Build and improve capacity of the CJS to successfully investigate, prosecute and punish people for terrorist offences.

SECURITY POWERS

5.2 The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2013 as amended provide sufficient grounds for security and intelligence agencies to deal with issues of terrorism. In particular, Part V of the Act adequately provides essential powers to conduct all forms of searches on individuals and structures, intelligence gathering and detention of suspects. The Attorney-General of the Federation and other law enforcement agencies are variously empowered on issues of terrorism, especially on investigations and prosecution.

5.3 Terrorists operate in secret. Therefore, intelligence is vital towards countering their threats. Successful counter-terrorist operations depend upon the collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including their membership, finances, intentions and modes of operation. The synergy of ONSA, Department of State Services (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Police, Armed Forces, and other stakeholders, particularly the civil populace, is therefore crucial to the work on Identify.

5.4 A major step in this direction will be the identification and profiling of groups or individuals whose actions promote terrorism. This depends on availability of data, which will assist in identifying those engaged in terrorism-related activities, their associates and locations. It allows for appropriate action against suspects/sympathisers at the right time. Government will therefore commit resources into gathering and analyzing information on the threat, organizing and tasking departments and agencies in the most effective way to address it. It must be emphasized that understanding the threat through adequate risk assessment still remains the fulcrum.

5.5 The safety of the public is the top priority for Government. It will, therefore, fully support the police and other security agencies in the challenges they encounter. Operational decisions on how to conduct counter-terrorism operations rest principally with the ONSA supported by other law enforcement agencies. The intelligence agencies led by the DSS are expected to drive the intelligence and information process to support such operations and to update the National Data Base on terrorism. The implication is the need for a robust system to facilitate information exchange/sharing amongst the various agencies. A national information sharing system, which will also ensure that agencies have access to information that may be relevant to serious crimes and terrorist threats, is therefore necessary and is being developed. This would ensure that the national security system has access to police records, which will be integrated with information from other security agencies. A National Data Base on terrorism and related crimes will be developed and domiciled in a place prescribed by the ONSA to which the various agencies will revert when the need arises.

5.6 An important aspect of the data is communication data, as terrorists are known to use all available modes to convey organizational messages, information and threats. It is, therefore, necessary for all Nigerians to register their SIM cards. Efforts are in top gear to ensure that the cyberspace, especially the Internet, is well monitored in conjunction with other countries. Where appropriate, legislation will be enacted to allow lawful interception of communication between individuals/organizations by security agencies. This will greatly assist intelligence gathering and data collection on terrorist activities, their supporters and sponsors.

5.7 Investigation. All law enforcement and security agencies are responsible for the gathering of intelligence and investigation of cases of terrorism.

5.8 Prosecution remains the preferred way of responding to persons involved in terrorism activity as provided for in the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. Other options may include deportation, freezing and seizing of financial assets and proscription of organizations.

5.9 Prosecution. The preferred way of disrupting terrorism activities is by apprehending those involved in planning acts of terrorism before they are able to execute their intentions and ensuring their successful prosecution in a court of law. This can be achieved through efficient gathering of necessary evidence and conduct of thorough investigations. Where prosecution is not possible, effective use will be made of a number of other security measures designed to make Nigeria a more hostile environment for terrorists to operate in.

5.10 Deportation. Where a person connected with terrorism activities in Nigeria is a foreign national, deportation and reporting his/her terrorist activities to the home State and other States will usually be an appropriate means of disrupting his activities. This is important in ensuring public safety, as well as sending a strong signal that foreign nationals who threaten the security of the nation will not be allowed to remain in Nigeria. The enactments of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 have provided sufficient legal tools to deport and exclude persons who have participated in terrorism.

5.11 Financial Control. Terrorism acts often revolve around personnel and resources, which usually require funding. Mainstream terrorist groups may have steady funding. However, most groups that engage in terrorism receive considerable clandestine funding from sponsors, which sometimes include governments. Unless sponsored by a government, terrorists tend to generate funds by engaging in conventional crimes such as bank robberies, kidnapping, syndicated car snatching, human and narcotics trafficking and operating seemingly lawful business ventures, among many others. When terrorists operate within the financial system, they can generate vital clues that could lead to their disruption and apprehension. To make the most of the financial intelligence, and make it harder for terrorists to operate, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and other such financial regulatory bodies have instituted control measures to check unusual/suspicious movement of funds. Financial institutions are required to keep proper records and report suspicious activities. The CBN, EFCC and NFIU will work closely with the ONSA and provide the required information regularly. To support this effort and to identify and eliminate sources of such funding, every suspected terrorist is to be subjected to financial investigation irrespective of the outcome of his case.

5.12 Seizing and Freezing of Assets. In spite of the financial control measures put in place, disrupting terrorists' ability to raise, move and use funds still poses a major challenge to law enforcement agents. The cost of carrying out bombing incidents may be relatively low but terrorist networks also need significant funding to support the rest of their activities such as recruitment, training and welfare payments to the families of deceased members. This is often achieved through ordinary criminal activities such as identity and cheque frauds and misuse of

charities. Reports on these are to be rendered to the ONSA regularly by the Law Enforcement/Intelligence Agencies. To further challenge terrorist fund raising, provisions in the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013 could freeze any existing assets and disable terrorists' ability to raise or move funds. Furthermore, going by relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, countries are required to freeze the assets of individuals who are involved in terrorism and stop them from receiving payments directly from such assets.

5.13 Proscription. The proscription of terrorist organizations also contributes towards making a place less conducive to terrorists and sends a strong signal that the country totally rejects such organizations and any claims they may wish to advance for legitimacy. Proscription is a difficult provision as it has the effect of outlawing previously lawful activity. Once an organization is proscribed, it is a criminal offence to belong to, support, or display support for that organization.

5.14 Working with Communities. Counter-terrorism operations can have an impact on relations between the law enforcement and local communities. It is in the interest of all that these operations are conducted in the most professional manner, taking due account of community and cultural sensitivities. It is also important that local communities are requested to establish counter-terrorism committees, and they will be provided with as much information as possible in a transparent and open manner. However, this needs to be balanced against maintaining the integrity of an ongoing counter-terrorism operation as well as legal constraints. Considerable effort is to be made by law enforcement agencies at all levels to engage local community leaders and persons in such circumstances through partnerships, regular informal contacts with community representatives, traditional, religious institutions and civil society organizations. Success in Identify would entail that, the following has been achieved:

a. Considerable reduction in the frequency of terrorist attacks. b. Considerable reduction in terrorists' ability to raise funds including the identification of their sources of funds and activities that generate funds. c. The security agencies have built the requisite capacity to effectively detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats. d. Government has effectively leveraged the capacity of community representatives, traditional and religious institutions and civil society organisations.

SECTION VI

PREPARE

6.1 The Prepare aspect of the NACTEST will be concerned with ensuring that the nation is ready to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped, and increase resilience for an immediate recovery from the aftermath of an attack. The objectives of the Prepare stream in the period will be:

a. Build capacity for all security agencies and stakeholder organizations to respond to and recover from all categories of terrorist attacks and other emergencies. b. Prepare dedicated agencies for response and recovery tasks for specified high- risk areas. c. Enhance information sharing and communication amongst agencies through joint training, operation and the provision of equipment.

6.2 To save lives, minimize damage, and recover from any future terrorist attacks, an efficient and effective response will be developed for any terrorist attack/incident. This informs the need for a comprehensive national system to harmonize and coordinate all necessary response assets quickly and effectively. This also involves planning, equipping, training and supervising the various response agencies and units adequately and regularly.

6.3 Attaining this objective involves developing and improving the capability of the units to respond effectively to the direct damage caused by terrorist attacks, and in particular to those individuals affected by it. There will be a ready response or backup to those essential services, which may be disrupted by an attack in order to absorb and minimize further indirect disruption.

6.4 For contingency planning to be harmonized and efficient, all organizations likely to contribute to the Prepare effort are to be identified for coordination. This is being done early with the provision of sound leadership if the response to an emergency is to be as effective as possible. Therefore, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) will provide appropriate leadership and direction to ensure resilience and purpose in safeguarding the nation, which is of fundamental importance to the Prepare effort.

6.5 Key elements of the Prepare aspect of this strategy include identification of potential risks the nation could face from terrorism and assessing their impact. Others are building capacities to respond to the threats as well as regular evaluation of preparedness. Responsibilities of all the stakeholders for the Prepare effort are specified in the Identify pillar of NACTEST. In view of the vast range of potential terrorist attack scenarios and the likely consequences, it is impracticable

to plan for every scenario. Therefore, planning seeks to build generic capabilities in response to a wide range of terrorist incidents and eventualities. It is important to rigorously assess the level of preparedness through training on scenario-based situations so as to keep pace with the evolving risks and enhance the efficiency of response mechanisms.

REASSURING COMMUNITIES

6.6 In most instances, terrorism aims to create fear, suspicion and division among communities or between communities and the Government. It is, therefore, necessary to put in place measures to monitor the reaction of communities to incidents and assess the risks to vulnerable sections. The task involves the Police, other public agencies and community leaders working together.

6.7 It must be noted that tackling an internal security challenge is impossible without public goodwill. All actions against terrorists must, therefore, assure the citizenry of Government's good intentions. Counter-terrorism actions executed professionally will build positive public opinion, which is a necessary precondition for successful operations. Success in the Prepare will entail that:

 a. First responders, security agencies and stakeholder organizations are able to respond to, and effectively recover from, various categories of terrorist attacks. b. There are dedicated agencies with capacity to respond to especially high-risk areas. c. There are additional capabilities readily available to manage both ongoing and new terrorist attacks.

SECTION VII

IMPLEMENT

7.1 The Implement aspect of the NACTEST involves the various elements acting together and cooperating to deal with a complex threat. Much of the work requires partnerships across the public sector involving the Police and emergency services, local authorities, and Federal Government Departments as well as partnerships with businesses in the private sector, and voluntary organizations. The Implement stream of the NACTEST therefore stipulates how it will be successfully executed and which Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) play what role. The summary of roles and responsibilities is at Annex A.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

7.2 Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The ONSA will provide the requisite leadership role in all national CT efforts. The CTC will be the driving tool of these efforts. To minimize vulnerabilities, the ONSA has conducted, as part of its risk assessment, an evaluation of the functional state of defence systems around Critical National Infrastructure and its implementation is ongoing.

7.3 Information Sharing System. ONSA will develop a single comprehensive database to serve as an information sharing system for the various agencies. The aim is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement, public safety and security agencies can collate their various data bases for a single purpose and easy access. Similar facilities will need to be created at State levels and linked to the central system.

7.4 Crime Registry. The Police/DSS will reactivate their respective crime registries immediately and store information digitally for ease of access. The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) is being strengthened to ensure that all Nigerians are identified through biometric data capture and at every opportunity well ahead of any requirements, e.g. in hospitals, health centres, health posts and schools. The Police/DSS will also develop a fingerprint identification system for all persons arrested for any offence, which can also be accessed, centrally by any of the national security agencies. The Police and other counter-terrorism outfits will have unrestricted access to the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), Population Census and Voter Registration Data Base.

7.5 Border Management. The Ministry of Internal Affairs will overhaul the entire border management system to make it more efficient while still supporting legitimate traffic of persons

and commerce. The borders will provide greater security through sound intelligence and coordinated national efforts and international cooperation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs will also ensure that persons passing through the borders are adequately documented and possess legitimate travel and identity documents. A multi-layer vetting system will be introduced to help ensure the correct identity of persons applying for such documents. The agencies will further step up efforts and cooperation with relevant security agencies, as appropriate, to improve on the security of production and issuance of identity and travel documents, and to prevent or detect any alterations. However, the Nigerian government through the ONSA should develop a comprehensive border security system capable of tackling the recurring security challenges stemming from the porous borders of the nation.

7.6 Internal Vetting and Screening of Security Personnel. In order to shore up the capacity of the various security agencies, each service/agency will conduct a comprehensive internal and external screening and vetting of its employees latest by the end of first quarter 2017 and thereafter forward details to the DSS for final vetting. This process will also be continuous and must apply to all subsequent selection processes. Cross vetting among various security agencies would also be encouraged.

7.7 Security of Airports and Seaports. In order to prevent undesirable elements from coming into the country or the importation of unauthorized and unlawful items, all the ports of entry will be adequately equipped, manned and secured. FAAN, NIMASA, NIS, NCS, DSS, NPA, NPF, NSCDC and the military have major roles to play, as checks must be thorough and accurately maintained. The roles of the services and agencies are prescribed in the appropriate legislations and regulations.

7.8 Vehicle Registration. All vehicles in the country must be registered against an individual or a particular organization. The FRSC has embarked on a total overhaul of the National Vehicle Identification System in order to restore the integrity of the vehicle number plates and enhance its overall security feature in line with global best practices. This is with a view to strengthening their capacity to support the National Security System. The Corps is revalidating all motor vehicle number plates' currently in circulation and replacing them with the improved number plates. This will make the forgery of these products extremely difficult and unattractive, thereby discouraging parallel production of vehicle number plates. Additionally, the Corps will tie the issuance of vehicle number plates to individual vehicle owners and no longer to the vehicles, and link vehicle registration with compulsory insurance cover, GSM SIM registration and FIRS tax clearance certification. The colours of vehicles at the time of registration will also be taken into cognizance. The colour of vehicles must be recorded by the FRSC and VIO at the point of registration. No vehicle should be given 2 registration numbers, except for high-profile security cases, which must

be cleared from the ONSA. All these will facilitate the tracking of those engaged in terrorism activities.

7.9 Issuance of Driver's Licence. Towards implementing a credible system of obtaining driver's licence and facilitating multi-layer vetting of drivers' licence issuance, the FRSC has put in place some strategies. Since 2008, records of new traffic offenders are obtained online and are accessible to all security agencies for crime detection and investigation. The Corps has also introduced a central printing facility. The process include physical capture and biometric entries (including the ten fingers) of an applicant at Information Processing Centres (IPC). The data will be instantly transferred to the central printing facility which conducts background security checks and authenticates the applicant's biometrics, physical features vis-a-vis valid GSM SIM registration.

7.10 Use of CCTV in Traffic and Crime Management. CCTV is an advanced form of road traffic management, which utilizes the advantages of IT to monitor, control and track offenders. The effectiveness of CCTV would depend on availability of credible and reliable database for prompt verification of traffic offenders and criminals by security agencies. Such a database is being developed. Deployment of CCTVs at critical intersections to run 24 hours of the day and through the week requires a central control room manned by trained personnel from relevant security agencies. It also requires installation of infrastructure to link the CCTV to FRSC and police electronic data for purposes of verification and investigation. Public and private organizations, individuals and corporate bodies should be encouraged to provide CCTVs in their areas of operation (shops, schools, restaurants, hotels, parks, filling stations etc). Access should also be granted to law enforcement agencies when required. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) is to embark on a nationwide campaign to promote this initiative to complement government efforts.

7.11 End User Certificate. ONSA will ensure a strict control of end user's certificate for arms, ammunition, explosives and accessories specified CT scanning equipment and other military- related hardware being imported into the country. A periodic review of the list of items will be made from time to time.

7.12 Enforcement of Firearms and Explosive Ordnances Laws. In order to prevent firearms and explosives from being illegally imported and unlawfully used, and from falling into wrong hands, the NPF supported by the DSS, NIS, NCS, NSCDC, FAAN, NIMASA, NIA, Ministry of Solid Minerals and Ministry of Agriculture will work to ensure the enforcement of extant laws. Detailed information on quarries in each locality will be maintained and monitored by the NPF, NSCDC and DSS.

7.13 Registration of Foreign House-helps. The NIS in each locality, with the support of the NPF and the NSCDC, will register all foreign house-helps in Nigeria irrespective of the provision of ECOWAS treaties.

7.14 Registration of Foreign and Casual Workers. The NIS, with the support of the NPF and NSCDC, will register all foreign construction and casual workers in Nigeria irrespective of the provision of the ECOWAS treaties.

7.15 Control of IED-Making Materials. In order to control and minimize the availability of bomb- making materials, the ONSA, NPF, DSS, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Federal Ministry of Mine and Steel and other Law Enforcement Agencies shall strengthen measures to monitor and control the sale, distribution and use of materials that can be used in making IEDs. The ONSA in collaboration with other Security Agencies are to develop a Counter-IED Strategy for the country.

7.16 Strict Measures on Birth and Death Registration. All births and deaths must henceforth be registered from Ward to State level irrespective of location by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) through collaboration with the National Population Commission (NPC). Mechanisms shall be put in place to strengthen existing health data collection systems and ensure the compliance of all concerned. The data so gathered will be maintained centrally by the ministries of National Planning and Health as well as the National Population Commission, which can be accessed by the NPF and other stakeholders.

7.17 Cyber Security. The Internet was created primarily to enhance unregulated and unlimited access to commercial, social and educational opportunities. The cyberspace has, however, been used by criminal elements to perpetrate crimes that range from advance fee fraud, business espionage, identity theft, banking fraud, outright attacks on data in computer networks, radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. The ONSA is to lead all relevant Agencies and Stakeholders to develop mechanisms in order to control the activities of cyber criminals.

7.18 Investigation and Prosecution. The Law Enforcement Agencies in Nigeria shall be responsible for the gathering of intelligence and investigations of terrorist acts while prosecution efforts will be coordinated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. This is to ensure fair and speedy trial of terrorism-related cases.

7.19 Disaster Management Efforts. In order to minimize the effects of terrorism attacks when they happens, NEMA, as the coordinating agency, will ensure that designated Disaster Response Units (DRUs) are created by Establishments and all Stakeholders. They are to constantly engage in joint training activities on their roles and coordination to be facilitated by NEMA. On all

occasions, non-security and intelligence departments, especially the Federal Ministry of Health, must be well represented on such activities.

7.20 Special Counter-Terrorism Force. Security Agencies and Armed Forces have, in recent times, developed counter-terrorism capabilities. However, employing these capabilities jointly for national counter-terrorism requires that they be organized and coordinated. ONSA and MOD will therefore ensure the availability of a dedicated force for counter-insurgency, swift reaction and efficient handling of counter-terrorism situations.

7.21 Maritime Security. The shipping industry and oil and gas installations, which are important sources of income for the growth of the country's economy, are confronted daily by diverse threats. This has become a major challenge, which the NIMASA and the NN and other maritime security agencies have to contend with. Piracy, illegal bunkering and terrorism are also known threats. The expanse of Nigeria's maritime area compares to about one-third of the total land area. However, the support of other maritime agencies will be needed to complement the efforts of the NN and NIMASA in order to improve the security of shipping and oil installations. The gaps between the security establishments and bases along the coastlines must be bridged with the development of coastal radars and deployment of more operational platforms to enable sufficient coverage of Nigeria's maritime domain. Government is to develop a robust Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) infrastructure in the form of Regional Maritime Domain Awareness Capability (RMDAC) to cover Nigeria's entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Additionally, the Navy Special Boat Service (SBS), which is vital for combating maritime terrorism, will need to be equipped with specialized boats, weapons, and sensors for more effective performance. Furthermore, intelligence gathered, especially details of arrests made at sea must be domiciled in the national information sharing system at ONSA. There is a need therefore to incorporate NAF maritime surveillance assets in liaison with NIMASA for maritime surveillance duties.

7.22 Security Alertness Plan. To ensure security alertness of the populace, the CTC-ONSA in collaboration with the Ministry of Information and Communication and the NOA will develop public enlightenment strategies that will sensitize the public on security awareness. The plan will include extensive use of the media to educate the masses, continued checks and monitoring of threat levels, issuance of threat level indicators and liaison with relevant Security and Law Enforcement Agencies towards working out measures against terrorism threats.

7.23 Counter Narratives. The CTC-ONSA will have an elaborate programme to counter extremist ideologies through print and electronic media, online and advocacy platforms. It will institutionalize strategic communication within the curriculum of Nigerian armed forces and security agencies training institutes, and expand the scope of the Civil Military Relations

Department of the Nigerian Army. It will also develop a national identity plan that focuses on education, in particular the school curriculum to enforce critical thinking skills as well as ethnic and religious unity.

7.24 De-Radicalization and Challenging Ideology. Radicalization has been the main factor behind acts of faith-based terrorism in Nigeria. To address this trend with a view to its reversal, the CTC-ONSA will develop measures towards counter radicalization and de-radicalization of extreme ideologies. The Government will carry out effective monitoring of the radicalization processes and its indicators, systematic identification of the highly vulnerable groups for assimilation into the society, and launching of anti-radicalization campaigns. The CTC-ONSA in liaison with religious and other Stakeholders will also develop programmes on counter radicalization and de-radicalization of fundamentalists and extremists.

7.25 Re-appraisal of the Criminal Justice System. To promote Criminal Justice System in counter-terrorism, the Federal Ministry of Justice shall create in its structure a dedicated Counter- Terrorism Division/Unit/Branch in order to drive the desired reform. To improve the law enforcement capability of Security Agencies, the Ministry of Justice will periodically organize workshops for all the relevant Stakeholders to review national legislation on terrorism, provide advice on drafting enabling laws, and provide in-depth assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies on the implementation of the legislation against terrorism. The Ministry of Justice will also ensure the development of an integrated criminal justice database, a direct line of interaction among the Director of Public Prosecutions of the Federation, the Police, the Nigerian Prisons, the DSS, the NSCDC and other law enforcement agencies to strengthen and guide investigations and avoid instances where crucial evidence is compromised.

7.26 Emergency Medical Response. The Ministry of Health at the Federal and State levels and Health Departments in Local Government are to establish robust Emergency Disaster Response Teams (EDRT) in their various areas of responsibilities. The teams will be adequately equipped to manage physical and psychological cases arising from terrorism-induced incidents, among others. The Ministries and Health Departments are also to ensure the provision of an Emergency Communication Centre (ECC), which will be domiciled with the EDRT and function on 24-hour basis.

7.27 Counter-Terrorism Call Centre. There shall be developed a toll-free CT Call Centre domiciled in ONSA for citizens to pass information anonymously on terrorism activities for security agencies. The Call Centre will function on 24-hour daily basis.

CONCLUSION

8.1 Terrorism is the most serious security threat currently confronting Nigeria. In keeping with Government's responsibility to ensure the safety of Nigerians, the NACTEST was developed to tackle the threat posed by terrorists and assure Nigerians of their safety. Additionally, this document is a reflection of Government's resolve that terrorists and those who sponsor them have no space to operate in the country.

8.2 Adequate measures have been proposed to prevent people from carrying out terror attacks or joining terrorist groups. The NACTEST also provides for measures to protect Critical National Infrastructure. Should these fail, there are other measures to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks on the citizenry.

8.3 Government is also establishing structures that will address situations that permit criminal elements and terrorist groups to operate with impunity in Nigeria. These measures include reforms within the national security apparatus. The ONSA has been tasked to develop adequate information sharing systems in order to enhance synergy amongst the security agencies. A Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) has been established in ONSA to coordinate these activities.

8.4 The implementation of the NACTEST imposes tasks on the security agencies as well as government and non-governmental agencies. This aspect of the NACTEST involves goals that would be attained within the period 2016-2018. The overall aim of NACTEST is the assurance of Government's commitment towards the protection and well being of the Nigerian people.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

MINISTRIES

1. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Contribute to NACTEST by promoting the development of agriculture to attain food sufficiency and generate employment. The Ministry will coordinate with Stakeholders in formulating policies to cover the importation, distribution and usage of fertilizer products as part of counter IEDs strategy.

2. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION

Responsible for national transportation policies and programmes and enhance the security of the transportation system including road, rail, maritime and aviation through continuous response to identified threats and security needs. Adopt a risk management approach and develop measures designed to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats in the transportation system.

3. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Collaborate with the Ministry of Information, National Orientation Agency (NOA), organized private sector and associations to promote a friendly investment atmosphere and develop trade guidelines that will discourage terrorist financing and illicit transactions.

4. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE

Work with other stakeholders to develop a communication strategy to disrupt terrorist media campaigns at local and international levels. Develop an Information Assurance and Awareness (IAA) strategy and collaborate with stakeholders to combat the spread of radical extremist messages.

5. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Support NACTEST by appropriately equipping the Armed Forces to face contemporary terrorist challenges. In the event of an attack that may exceed the capacity of civil response, the Ministry can support the Forestall aspect of NACTEST through Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

6. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Support the FORESTALL pillar of NACTEST by providing an enabling environment for education to be free from, and devoid of, any form of extremist ideology. Develop curricula to address needs at the grass roots consistent with national unity and human development objectives. This should

include a robust civic education programme in schools. The Ministry will introduce a process where education administrators and practitioners are trained to identify and counsel pupils/students who are at the threshold of being radicalized.

7. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT

Ensure environmental protection and conservation of natural resources. The Ministry is responsible for dealing with, and managing the impact of, terrorist incidents on the environment, plants and animal health, food and drinking water, waste management, farming, fisheries, communities etc in the event of a terrorist attack.

8. FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY ADMINISTRATION

Liaise with other security agencies and key federal departments to develop a blueprint for the security and administration of the Federal Capital Territory in line with identified threats and challenges.

9. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In conjunction with NIA and DIA, the Ministry has overall responsibility for the coordination and delivery of NACTEST overseas. Deploy instruments of diplomacy to enhance implementation of the NACTEST in all our international engagements.

10. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Support NACTEST by providing oversight for Immigration, Passport Control, Prison Administration and Fire Service. Ensure there is an appropriate upgrade of the entire border security management system, especially for the northern part of the country. Drive the protection of critical national infrastructure.

11. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF WOMEN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Collaborate with state Ministries of Women Affairs and Social Development and other stakeholders to ensure proper provision, coordination and regulation of Psychosocial Support Services to all categories of women, children person with disabilities, families and other vulnerable groups to prevent imbibing terrorist ideologies and help them develop resistance in handling/managing social welfare services for victims in welfare centres/institutions for rehabilitation, re-unification and proper re-integration into the society.

12. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

Establish a dedicated division/section for National Security that will ensure that there is a significant capacity in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) to deal with terrorism cases efficiently, effectively and securely. Partner with relevant institutions to introduce legislation that criminalizes incitement and recruitment in places of religious training and worship. Ensure fair and speedy trial of terror suspects in accordance with the rule of law and develop an integrated criminal justice database. Provide leadership in the development of a seamless and coordinated approach to investigation and prosecution of terror cases among the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) of the Federation, the Police, the DSS, Nigeria Prisons and other Law Enforcement Agencies.

13. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES

Contribute to NACTEST as lead ministry for all petroleum matters. In conjunction with security agencies/services, it is responsible for ensuring the security of the nation's petroleum supplies and distribution of oil and gas) and assets.

14. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT

Support NACTEST with efforts aimed at generating employment for Nigerians and drive skill acquisition processes at Federal, State and Local Government levels. This will provide platform for economic self- actualization among the general populace and the youth as it will go a long way in helping to reduce exposure to the tenants of radicalization.

15. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF YOUTH AND SPORTS

The Ministry to develop a comprehensive framework to cater for the needs of underage children and introduce a coordinating mechanism for empowerment programmes in Agriculture, in conjunction with state government through skill acquisition, vocational studies and counselling. In addition, introduce sporting activities in collaboration with Nigerian Prisons, which will provide a favourable platform for engaging Designated Interested Client (DIC), youths and other street children to desist from violent extremism. The Ministry will revive the culture of Community/Town Hall as a veritable tool of engagement to build community cohesion and resilience.

16. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH

In collaboration with the Ministry of National Planning and National Population Commission, put in place mechanisms to strengthen existing health data collection systems. Set up institutions to develop skills for the identification and counselling of vulnerable persons who are at the threshold of being radicalized, including facilities for PTSD nationwide. Provide emergency preparedness

and response support to deal with emergencies arising from catastrophic acts of terrorism.

17. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Contribute to the Forestall strand of NACTEST by encouraging the exploration of scientific methods of research and development for CT capabilities. Work in conjunction with the Nigerian Communications Satellite (NIGCOMSAT) to explore how NIGCOMSAT 1 & 2 can be deployed to complement border security.

18. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF POWER, WORKS AND HOUSING

In conjunction with other security agencies, ensure adequate security for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and speedy restoration of damage infrastructure as well as set up a back-up mechanism in case of terror-related breaches.

19. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF SOLID MINERALS DEVELOPMENT

Contribute to NACTEST by giving information on the importation, manufacturing, distribution, sales and handling. It will also assist in the restriction on the movement of explosives and accessories allowed into the country. It will also assist in prevention/reporting on the theft and diversion of explosives and accessories in the country.

DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES

1. NIGERIAN COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NCC)

The Commission is responsible for the regulation of telecommunication services in the country. The NCC is to expand the national call centre for information dissemination to rural communities and re-invigorate and enforce regulations on SIM card registration and monitoring.

2. FEDERAL RADIO CORPORATION OF NIGERIA (FRCN)

The FRCN is to pro-actively initiate multi-media campaigns with the support and cooperation of relevant stakeholders to inform, educate and enlighten the public on CT initiatives and be carried along at all levels of the work streams for dissemination of relevant information and awareness creation among the public.

3. NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMMISSION (NBC)

The Commission is to regulate radio/TV broadcasts, allocation of frequencies as well as the monitoring of transmissions.

4. NIGERIAN COMMUNICATION SATELLITE (NIGCOMSAT)

The NIGCOMSAT will assist in developing satellite communication links in support of security forces operations. It will also provide communications Satellite based infrastructure for information collation, dissemination and analysis in support of counter terrorism activities utilizing existing infrastructures.

5. NATIONAL SPACE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (NASRDA)

The NASRDA will assist in acquiring geo-spatial data via communication satellite in support of security forces operations. It will also assist some MDA's with spatial data information that will help with the development planning most especially in agriculture, water management, census, urban development planning etc.

6. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (CBN)

The CBN and NFIU are to work closely with the ONSA and other security agencies to monitor unusual/suspicious movement of funds most especially as such movements relates to terrorism financing.

7. NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION (NNPC)

Ensure secure and safe distribution of petroleum products, in conjunction with other agencies and develop a contingency plan for terror-related disruptions. The NNPC will secure the operation of the downstream and upstream sectors of the energy industry.

8. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SERVICES (DSS)

The Department is to serve as the lead agency on information/Intelligence collection/collation on all non-military components of internal security as well as prevention and detection of terror- related activities/crimes. The agency is to reactivate/resuscitate the crime registry for the storage of digital information and collaborate with the Ministry of Information and NOA to develop public enlightenment programs that will sensitize the public. It will also liaise with religious bodies and relevant departments in the academia to develop de-radicalization programmes.

9. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NIA)

The NIA is to serve as the lead agency for external information/intelligence collection/collation and, in conjunction with relevant MDAs, monitor all terror-related activities in the Forestall, Identify and Secure strands of NACTEST.

10. DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

The Agency is to coordinate the CT effort of the DMI, DNI and DAI and, in conjunction with relevant agencies, is the lead agency for the collation of military-related intelligence within and outside the country.

11. NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE (NPF)

The NPF is the lead agency for the maintenance of law and order and the prevention and detection of crime. The NPF is the first responder in the five strands of NACTEST with support from other security agencies. It will update the crime registry and store information digitally for easy access. In conjunction with the DSS, NSCDC, NIS, NCS, FAAN, NIMASA, NIA and the Ministry of Solid Minerals, ensure that firearms and explosives are not illegally imported and unlawfully used in the country. In collaboration with DSS, maintain and monitor information on quarries and industrial explosive sites in the country. The NPF is to institute measures to monitor and control the sales, distribution and use of materials that may be used in making IEDs. In collaboration with the National Space Research Development Agency (NASRDA), Ministries of Science and Technology, Finance, Information and the Military, the NPF shall develop mechanisms to control the activities of cybercriminals.

12. FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS (FRSC)

The FRSC is to provide support especially data for the Forestall, Identify and Prepare strands of NACTEST.

13. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION (EFCC)

In collaboration with relevant agencies, investigate financial crimes, money laundering and terrorist financing in support of the Forestall and Identify work streams of NACTEST.

14. NATIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (NDLEA)

Collaborative functions with other security agencies and MDA's to enforce the prevention of the cultivation, production/manufacture, sale, distribution, abuse, importation and exportation of illicit drugs and substances as well as diversion of precursor chemicals for illicit purposes.

15. NIGERIAN FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (NFIU)

In conjunction with other relevant financial institutions, the NFIU is responsible for the receipt and analysis of financial disclosures and currency transactions. NFIU will report suspicious transactions and disseminate financial intelligence to competent authorities.

16. NIGERIAN IMMIGRATION SERVICE (NIS)

NIS controls and monitors immigration activities at all entry and exit points in the country. Complement internal security efforts through effective manning of major entry points as well as the patrolling of borders. Register all foreign house-helps and foreign construction workers in the country and, in conjunction with other agencies, monitor and ensure the control of refugees and refugee camps in the country.

17. NIGERIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE (NCS)

Collaborative functions with other agencies to support and enforce the prevention of illegal importation of arms and ammunition, illicit drugs including toxic and hazardous substances. The NCS is to provide first-hand intelligence on importation and exportation trends to help contain terrorist threats.

18. NIGERIAN PRISONS SERVICE

Develop capacity for prison personnel and institutions to tackle the issue of de-radicalization of convicted terrorists and those awaiting trials. Equally develop a mechanism for prison aftercare system for easy reintegration into society.

19. NIGERIAN SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (NSCDC)

Assist in the maintenance of law and order, and will be the lead agency in emergencies and disasters. Protection of government facilities and oversight functions for private security companies.

20. NATIONAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT COMMISSION (NIMC)

Responsible for the issuance of identity cards (IDs) for eligible Nigerians and legal residence only and maintaining a proper record/database for all categories of persons.

21. DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION

Lead agency on oversight, safety and security of air travel and ensure periodic review of aviation security protocol. Charge relevant agencies including Federal Airport Authorities with the screening of air travellers and their baggage as well as the need for proper screening in the following air security areas:

i. Pre-board screening. ii. Hold baggage screening. iii. Non-passenger screening for restricted areas. iv. Ensure the safety of approaches to airports for safe take-off and landing.

v. Ensure the progressive erection of perimeter fence at airports.

22. NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION (NRC)

The Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC) is saddled with the exclusive legal right to operate rail services in Nigeria. It helps in generating employment, transportation of goods and services. It also helps in preventing transportation of improvised explosive devices (IED) and other offensive weapons by terrorists in the railway system.

23. NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY (NPA)

The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) governs and operates Nigeria ports that include Lagos Port, Tin Can Island Port Apapa, Calabar Port, Delta Port, Rivers Port and Onne Port. Operations of NPA are carried out under the Ministry of Transport in conjunction with the Nigerian Shippers council. NPA ensures that terrorists do not import/export improvised explosive device (IED) and other offensive materials into the country.

24. NIGERIAN MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND SAFETY AUTHORITY (NIMASA)

The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Authority (NIMASA) is responsible for regulations related to Nigerian shipping, maritime labour and coastal waters. The agency also undertakes inspections and provides search and rescue services. It also helps in providing security along our coastal waters against attacks by terrorists that may use our maritime domain to perpetuate such acts.

25. FEDERAL INLAND WATERWAYS AUTHORITY

Federal Inland Waterways Authority (FIWA) is established with the primary responsibility to improve and develop Nigeria's "Inland waterways for navigation and to help transport human and material resources. In addition to that, it will assist in preventing the transportation of improvised explosive devices (IED) and other offensive materials that may be used be used by terrorists.

26. NIGERIAN NUCLEAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY

The Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) coordinates efforts in the peaceful application of nuclear energy in conjunction with relevant MDAs and to prevent radioactive materials from being used for acts of terrorism. The NNRA also regulate radiological protection and nuclear safety so as to ensure the protection of life, health, property and the environment from the handful efforts of ionizing radiation. It will ensure safety and security of nuclear materials and to enable Nigeria meet its international obligations on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

28. NATIONAL AGENCY FOR FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL (NAFDAC)

The Agency is charged with the detection of fake drugs and drug money. It will also ensure the importation of genuine drugs and the distribution of safe drugs devoid of terrorist-induced contamination.

29. NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (NEMA)

Coordinating agency for disaster management and saddled with the exploration of the imperatives of multi-agency cooperation in emergency management. The NEMA is to provide appropriate leadership and direction to other relevant agencies on CT response matters to ensure resilience. It will ensure that Disaster Response Cells (DRC) are created by respective establishments. It will also coordinate training for stakeholders especially Disaster Risk Reduction related efforts (including NGOs and faith-based organizations) and encourage regular joint training activities.

30. NATIONAL ORIENTATION AGENCY (NOA)

The NOA is to serve as the information hub of government, responsible for the publication and dissemination of government activities. With other relevant agencies, develop security consciousness and situational awareness through concerted media campaigns. Engage with the communities to ensure better security and civic education, promote activities that would engender social inclusiveness and community cohesion. Identify signs of radicalization early and flag these off into an early warning machinery. The NOA will embark on a nationwide campaign to promote the installation of CCTV by public and private organizations, individuals and corporate bodies.

31. NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (NAPTIP)

Responsible for the supervision and prevention of child labour, prevent children from being used or sold into slavery, assist victims of child trafficking and combat trafficking of persons who could be exploited for terrorist activities.

32. NIGERIA INTER-RELIGIOUS COUNCIL (NIREC)

Foster inter-religious harmony among Nigerians and ensure the integration of faith-based organizations into the humanitarian response system in emergencies and terrorist attacks.

33. DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

Establish a robust CT Unit (Special Operations Force) and coordinate the CT efforts of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The DHQ is to coordinate and implement the mandate of the Multinational

Joint Task Force (MNJTF) involving the Armed Forces of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Republic of Benin.

34. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

The ONSA is to provide the requisite leadership role in all national CT efforts and drive NACTEST. It will maintain a comprehensive list of the country's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and formulate a policy for its protection. ONSA will ensure synergy among the DSS, NIA, the Police, Armed Forces and other Stakeholders. ONSA is to coordinate and ensure oversight of response units in the respective Services. It is to develop a single and comprehensive database to serve as an information sharing system for the various agencies. It will also ensure stricter control for the issue of End-user Certificates for arms, ammunition, explosives, CT scanning equipment and other military security-related hardware. In conjunction with other agencies, ONSA will use the media to educate the public on threat levels including issuance of threat level indicators and liaise with the Services/Agencies towards the mitigation of terrorism threats. It will work out modalities on how the Nigeria-Republic of Niger Joint Border Patrol could be replicated with Chad and Cameroon. It will also develop a benchmarking framework for the evaluation of the implementation and review of NACTEST.

35. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)

The Government (ONSA-CTC) is to partner with CSOs in all facets of its CT programme, particularly of the following areas:

a Addressing conditions conducive for the spread of terrorism including, human rights, conflict resolution, rule of law, social, political and economic issues. The CSOs are to engage in outreach activities and taking proactive steps to address the root causes of terrorism.

b Targeted programmes of cooperation focusing on promotion of dialogue and tolerance.

c Provide Policy advice and expertise on aspects of preventing terrorism and developing security consciousness and situation awareness through sustained public enlightenment campaigns.

d Mobilization and the sensitization of the general public on how to respond to major emergency security situations.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AQAP - Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQI - Al Qaeda in Iraq AQIM - Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQKB - Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalion BOKO HARAM - Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad CBN - Central Bank of Nigeria CCTV - Closed-Circuit Television CJS - Criminal Justice System COIN - Counter Insurgency CNI - Critical National Infrastructure CSO - Civil Society Organizations CT - Counter-Terrorism CTC - Counter-Terrorism Centre CVE - Counter Violent Extremism DMUs - Disaster Management Units DRU - Disaster Response Unit DSS - Department of State Services ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States EFCC - Economic and Financial Crimes Commission FAAN - Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria FRSC - Federal Road Safety Corps IAA - Information Assurance and Awareness IEDs - Improvised Explosive Devices IGP - Inspector-General of Police IPC - Information Processing Centre IPOB - Indigenous People of Biafra ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria IT - Information Technology MAD - Movement for the Advancement of Democracy MASSOB - Movement for the Actualisation of the

Sovereign State of Biafra MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta MoD - Ministry of Defence MOOTW - Military Operations Other Than War NACTEST - National Counter-Terrorism Strategy NAPTIP - National Agency for the Prohibition of

Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters NASRDA - National Space Research Development Agency

T H E N AT I O N A L C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M S T R AT E G Y (N A C T E S T) 2 0 1 6 (R E V I S E D)

NCS - Nigeria Customs Service NDA - Niger Delta Avengers NEMA - National Emergency Management Agency NFIU - Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit NIA - National Intelligence Agency NIGCOMSAT - Nigeria Communication Satellite NIMASA - Nigerian Maritime Administration and

Safety Agency NIMC - National Identity Management Commission NIMS - National Identity Management System NIS - Nigeria Immigration Service NMB - Nigerian Manpower Board NOA - National Orientation Agency NPA - Nigeria Ports Authority NPF - Nigeria Police Force NPS - Nigerian Prison Service NSA - National Security Adviser NSCDC - National Security and Civil Defence Corps ONSA - Office of the National Security Adviser RU - Response Units SIM Card - Subscriber Identification Module Card SALW - Small Arms and Light Weapons TTP - Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan UN - United Nations VBIED - Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device VIO - Vehicle Inspection Officer